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Abstract: Various criteria have been formulated to deter-
mine whether or not someone should be classified as an 
intellectual. These criteria range from patterns of recruit-
ment to responses to various cultural or political move-
ments.  This paper is devoted, however, to examining the 
rise of Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia in the last three 
decades of the twentieth century. It highlights, as a subject 
of analysis, the significance of socio-political (and even 
religious) context as well as the educational background 
upon which the formation of those Indonesian Muslim 
intellectuals is based. An important finding shows that the 
rise of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals in such a time frame 
resulted mainly from three vectors, movements in Islamic 
thought, socio-political relations between the government 
and the Muslim community, and developments in 
education. The educational background of Muslim intellect-
tuals, as another finding encapsulates, is not monolithic 
since some of them pursued their studies in Islamic 
educational institutions, and some others in more general, 
public ones.  
Keywords: Muslim intellectual, the renewal of Islamic 
thought, government-Muslims relation, Muslim student 
movement. 
                                                 
1 This paper is originally part of my PhD dissertation entitled Muslim Intellectuals in 
Contemporary Indonesia: Survey of Muslim Intellectual Institutional Affiliation and Thought (1966 
–2001) submitted to the Faculty of History and Cultural Studies, Freie Universität, 
Berlin, Germany, in 2003. I am grateful for the comments of Gudrun Krämer, Ingrid 
Wessel, Ulrike Freitag, Axel Havemann, Stephan Rosiny and Akh. Muzakki on an 
earlier version of this paper. 
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Introduction 
One of the most important debates among scholars is whether, in 
playing a role in society, intellectuals should or should not be affiliated 
with certain institutions. There are at least two opinions on this matter. 
First, intellectuals should not be affiliated with any institutions. 
Second, intellectuals should be affiliated with institutions. The first 
opinion is promoted in order to guarantee the independence of 
intellectuals in criticising and directing society. In accordance with 
Brym’s idea, this opinion argues that intellectuals will lose their 
independence through employment in the institutional superstructure.2 
Presenting themselves as independent intellectuals, or referred to in 
the Coser’s phrase as “unattached intellectuals”,3  “they may continue 
to provide some of the major critical ideas that will later spread to a 
wider public and to public decision-makers, and they may continue to 
help set standards and influence ideological trends”. According to 
Coser, “they are in a privileged position to do so because they are less 
restrained by institutional pressures, more mobile because of their 
freedom from institutional roots, less subject to regular obligations and 
routines than are other categories of intellectuals”.4   
For many observers, a critical and progressive attitude is the most 
important characteristic in which someone could be categorized as 
intellectual or not.5 Concerning politics, for example, the power of 
intellectuals is sometimes used to justify the government’s power and 
decision. This could eliminate intellectual independence and influence.6 
                                                 
2 See, Robert J. Brym, Intellectuals and Politics (London: Goerge Allyn and Unwin, 1980), 
p. 12. An example in an Indonesian context is what was reflected in the case of Emha 
Ainun Najib, the chairman of the Department of Cultural Dialogue of the Ikatan 
Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (ICMI/the Association of Indonesian Muslim 
Intellectuals, established in 1990), who quitted the Central Board of the ICMI in 
August 1991 because he was not satisfied with the political line taken by the 
organization. For further information in this case, see Editor (Weekly News), 14 March 
1992. See also Darul Aqsha, Dick van der Meij, and Johan Hendrik Meuleman (eds.), 
Islam in Indonesia: A Survey of Events and Developments from 1988 to March 1993 (Jakarta: 
INIS, 1995), p. 267. 
3 A. Lewis Coser, Men of Ideas (New York: London, 1965), especially pp. 263 – 274. 
4 Ibid., p.  273. 
5 Brym, Intellectuals and Politics, p. 12.  
6 In many cases, the legitimacy of intellectuals to the power is needed and politically 
right. As described by Coser, there are two kinds of legitimacy in this case: first is that 
intellectuals may fashion new legitimacies in historical situations in which the old ones 
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For this reason, there are people who believe that it is important to 
ensure the independence of intellectuals from institutions. But, the 
consequence of this could lead intellectuals to an “ivory tower” 
condition.  
The second opinion recommends that intellectuals should be 
affiliated with institutions. The advocates of this opinion worry that 
intellectuals could not play their role directly and even exclude 
themselves from society if they are not affiliated with a certain 
institution. In line with this idea, Brym argues that intellectuals should 
understand their positions in society. He said in his book, Intellectuals 
and Politics: “intellectuals in the modern world had to come to grips 
with the question to which class (if any) they belonged and to which 
political current they adhered.”7  
As reflected in the experience of many countries, the involvement 
of intellectuals is needed, especially ―borrowing Shils’ word―“in the 
gestation, birth, and continuing life of the new states”, such as in Asia 
and Africa.8 Moreover, in developed countries, intellectuals are being 
absorbed into rapidly expanding and increasingly state directed-
institutional superstructures.9 In the United States, for example, as 
described by Coser, “intellectuals are located in a great variety of 
institutional settings as well as in the interstices between a numbers of 
institutional orders.”10 With similar arguments, the involvement of 
                                                                                                      
no longer seem sufficient to shore up the edifice of power, or they may create entirely 
novel systems of legitimacy in order to justify new systems of power. This kind of 
thought is categorized as conservative thought. Second is that intellectuals create a 
justification mechanism for a new system of power. As a new power was established or 
seized by a new revolutionary-intellectual government, the intellectuals are needed for 
the defense against those who disputed the legitimacy of the power. For a further 
description of such intellectuals, see Coser, Men of Ideas, pp. 140-142, and pp. 189-205.  
7 Brym, Intellectuals and Politics, p. 11. 
8 Compare with Edward Shils’ idea in his article “The Intellectuals in Political Development of 
the New States” in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), Political Development and 
Social Change (New York: London, 1971), p. 249, where he said that “the gestation, 
birth, and continuing life of the new states of Asia and Africa, through all their 
vicissitudes, are in large measure the work of intellectuals. In no state-formations in all 
of human history have intellectuals played such a role as they have in these events of 
the present century”. 
9 Brym, Intellectuals and Politics, p. 12.  
10 See Coser, Men of Ideas, p. 249.  
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intellectuals in society or even in political leadership is badly needed in 
the context of developing countries.   
This paper is not much about the debate concerning what 
intellectuals should do in dealing with the issue of intellectual-cum-
organisational affiliation. Rather, it is devoted to examining the rise of 
Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia even though the addressing of the 
issue of organisational affiliation of those Muslim intellectuals will also 
be conducted in parts of its analysis. The paper highlights, as a subject 
of analysis, the significance of socio-political (and even religious) 
context as well as educational background upon which the formation 
of those Indonesian Muslim intellectuals is based. As a focus of 
analysis, the paper is restricted to the time frame in the last three 
decades of the twentieth century.  
The Emergence of Muslim Intellectuals: 
A Socio-political Context  
As a starting point for analysing the rise of Muslim intellectuals in 
the last three decades of the twentieth century, let us look at some 
important aspects concerning what happened to educated Muslims and 
organizations of Muslim scholars before 1970. M. Dawam Rahardjo 
describes in his book Intelektual, Intelegensia dan Perilaku Politik Bangsa11, 
that in 1964 an organization for Muslim scholars called Ikatan Sarjana 
Muslim Indonesia (ISMI/the Association for Indonesian Muslim 
Scholars) was established. ISMI was established in response to the 
existing political and ideological competition and conflict against 
communism and the left wing nationalist movement.12  
Another similar organization was established by H.M. Subchan 
Z.E in 1969; its name was Persatuan Sarjana Muslim Indonesia 
                                                 
11 The book was published in 1993, three years after the establishment of the ICMI, 
which he played an important role in founding processes. During my interview with 
Dawam Rahardjo (Jakarta, 24 August 2000), I could not get any information about the 
historical dynamic of Muslim intellectuals, especially during the 1960s. What he told 
me was the historical background of ICMI’s founding in 1990. Therefore, I used his 
book for further historical exploration.  
12 In the context of socio-political development in 1990, ISMI was suggested by 
Nurcholish Madjid to be the name of the Association of Muslim scholars later known 
as ICMI. For a further explanation of this, see Robert W. Hefner, “Islam, State and 
Civil society: ICMI and the Struggle for Indonesian Middle Class,” Indonesia, No. 56 
(1993), p. 1; Greg Barton, Gagasan Islam Liberal di Indonesia (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999), 
p. 506.  
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(Persami/the Union of Indonesian Muslim Scholars). The 
establishment of Persami aimed to unite Muslim scholars from 
different political parties and religious groups. Under the leadership of 
Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo, Persami attempted to improve the 
participation of Muslim scholars in the development processes 
promoted by the New Order government. Unlike ISMI which was 
developed in response to the existing political and ideological conflict 
as indicated above, Persami was founded as a reaction towards a new 
situation, namely the development program.13  
Despite their varied organisational affiliations, many Muslim 
scholars from the 1970s generation went to study in Western 
countries. Three people can be mentioned as examples, and just by 
chance they graduated from the same university (The University of 
Chicago): Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005), M. Syafi’i Maarif (born in 
1935), and M. Amien Rais (born in 1944). Many others went to study 
in the Middle Eastern countries, such as Abdurrahman Wahid (born in 
1940), while still others graduated from Indonesian universities, 
including M. Dawam Rahardjo (born in 1942).  
There are three important activities which became preconditions 
for the rise of Muslim intellectuals. First, there emerged a critical 
analysis formulated through the writing of articles or the presenting of 
ideas in seminars or discussion forums. Second, there developed ideas 
for constructing a model of societal improvement. Third, there was an 
innovation in professional works in different fields such as medicine, 
societal health, education, management, accountancy, journalism, and 
law.   
In addition to that, there was a wide range of efforts to translate 
and advance Western and Middle Eastern intellectual ideas. In the 
1980s particularly after the Iranian Revolution, attempts to introduce a 
large number of ‘Ali Shariati’s works (mostly discussing revolution, 
social change, and the role of Muslim intellectuals), for example, were 
conducted into Indonesian readers. Following Madjid’s return to 
Indonesia, Maarif also introduced Fazlur Rahman’s ideas of neo-
modernism. Ismā‘il Farūqi, Hassan Hanafi, Ziauddin Sardar, and 
Murtada Mutahhari were among other foreign Muslim intellectuals 
whom Indonesian Muslims intellectuals referred to and whose ideas 
                                                 
13 M. Dawam Rahardjo, Intelektual, Intelegensia dan Prilaku Politik Bangsa (Bandung: 
Mizan, 1993), pp. 23-24. 
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were introduced.14 To a certain extent, their ideas influenced the 
intellectual character of Indonesian Muslims and even influenced the 
model of Islamic thought in Indonesia.  
What were then the important factors that influenced the 
emergence of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals in the 1970s and 1980s? 
First was the result of the renewal of the Islamic thought movement 
promoted by scholars such as Madjid, Harun Nasution, and Mukti Ali. 
Second was the consequence of social and political relations between 
the government and the Muslim community during the New Order 
era. Third was a fruit of the development of education and of Muslim 
student movement.  
As described by many researchers such as Greg Barton, Robert W 
Hefner, Muhammad Kamal Hasan and M. Syafii Anwar, the renewal of 
the Islamic thought movement in Indonesia can be understood 
through two important points. First, the renewal of Islamic thought 
was introduced by Madjid in the beginning of 1970. Second, the 
renewal of Islamic thought was promoted by the “Limited Group” in 
Yogyakarta.  
The Limited Group, founded in the middle of 1967, was 
composed of several students, including mainly Ahmad Wahib, 
Djohan Effendi, and Rahardjo. The group met in the on-campus 
house of Mukti Ali, a leading lecturer of the Institut Agama Islam Negeri 
(IAIN/State Institute for Islamic Studies) who later became the 
Minister of Religious Affairs. In addition to the regular core members, 
a wide variety of intellectuals, students and activists, Muslim and non-
Muslim, dropped in for “closed door” discussions on religious, moral 
and philosophical issues. The ideas produced by the Limited Group, 
including the turning ummah (Muslim community) away from party 
political activity and the strengthening of the non-sectarian state 
philosophy of Pancasila, unfortunately, attracted a very poor public 
attention at the time. According to Barton, the reason is that until the 
publication Wahib’s diary and private writings in 1981,15 there was little 
in print to document what might be called the genesis of neo-
modernism (in this case referring to the renewal of Islamic thought) in 
Indonesia.  
                                                 
14 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
15 The book was edited by his friends, Djohan Effendy and Ismet Natsir, under the 
title: Pergolakan Pemikiran Islam, Catatan Harian Ahmad Wahib (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1981). 
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In contrast with the Limited Group, the renewal of Islamic 
thought promoted by Madjid attracted the attention of not only the 
public in general but also Muslim intellectuals specifically at that time. 
This began with Madjid’s address on the 3rd of January 1970. Madjid 
suggested two important steps, namely modernization and 
secularization. In his opinion, modernization means tearing down an 
irrational system of thought and work and replacing it with a rational 
one, because Alla>h orders us to always use our reason. Modernization 
is an order of God and fundamental to Islamic doctrine.16 
“Modernization is rationalization” Madjid said. It is closely related to 
secularization. What is meant by secularization here is not an 
implementation of secularism but a “liberating development”: 
secularizing what originally should be secular and liberating Muslims 
from assuming it as a religious matter. 17  
This idea led to the emergence of many critiques from other 
Muslim Intellectuals. Some of them came from the older generation, 
such as M. Natsir, Subchan ZE and M. Rasyidi. Rasyidi, for example, 
made his critique in his book Koreksi terhadap Drs. Nurcholish Madjid 
tentang Sekularisasi [Correction to Nurcholish Madjid about 
Secularization].18 Natsir criticised the renewal of Islamic thought by 
Madjid, not only for being irrelevant but also for becoming a danger to 
the Islamic essence.19 Subchan ZE argued that the renewal of Islamic 
thought is not necessary because Islam is a complete religion. If there 
is a renewal effort, he further argues, it should avoid changing 
“‘aqīdah”.20 
Apart from critiques as such, Madjid’s view has continuously had 
its place and influence. His view has frequently become the main 
theme of many mass media.  Tempo, a weekly magazine, for example, 
intensively echoed Madjid’s views. M. Deden Ridwan writes that he 
has found many volumes of this magazine which had Madjid’s views as 
                                                 
16 Nurcholish Madjid,  Islam, Kemoderenan dan Keindonesiaan (Bandung: Mizan, 1995),  p. 
172. 
17  See Ibid., p. 201. 
18 M. Rasyidi, Koreksi terhadap Drs. Nurcholish Madjid tentang Sekularisasi (Jakarta: Bulan 
Bintang, 1972). 
19 Tempo, 29 July 1972, p. 45. See also M. Deden Ridwan, “Tempo dan Gerakan Neo-
Modernisme Islam Indonesia,” Ulumul Quran, No. 3, Vol. VI (1995), pp. 56-57. 
20 Ridwan, “Tempo dan Gerakan Neo-Modernisme.” 
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its main topic, specifically Tempo’s volumes of May 1971, April 1971, 
July 1972, December 1972, January 1973, June 1986, and April 1993.21 
In the June 1986 edition, Tempo stressed that after fifteen years, the 
history stood side by side with Madjid’s view. As a result, Indonesian 
people has not worried anymore to actualize Islamic values and to say 
that they are Muslims without any eagerness of being correlated with 
the Islamic state movement or Islamic party.22   
The pioneering Madjid’s activity in promoting the importance of 
renewing Islamic thought in Indonesia gave rise to two consequences. 
First is that the renewal idea inspired other Muslim intellectuals to 
criticise it. Second is that this idea caused the emergence of a new 
generation of young Muslim intellectuals who stood behind Madjid’s 
ideas.  
Besides Madjid, Nasution (born in 1919) also played an important 
role in promoting the importance of renewing Islamic thought. The 
difference is that while Madjid, because of his involvement in the 
Muslim Student Association, had many supporters and therefore his 
idea was publicly known, Nasution directed his ideas toward the 
educated Muslim elites. In other words, Nasution expressed his ideas 
primarily for people affiliated with educational institutions such as 
IAIN, Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan (IKIP/Teachers Training 
Collage), and the University of Indonesia (UI) in Jakarta. 
Acknowledged as a mujaddid and a reformer in Islamic theology,23 
Nasution has had an impact on what Madjid called the intellectual 
creativity and learning capacity of IAIN.24 He successfully opened the 
gates for academic people in IAIN to think rationally. He rendered his 
academic institution many services. One of them was orienting the 
curriculum of IAIN not merely to fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) studies 
but also to philosophy, and the comparative studies between schools 
of law. In addition, he also successfully brought IAIN to the same level 
as other higher educational institutions. Under his leadership, IAIN 
                                                 
21 Ibid., p. 52. Further evidence of the importance of Madjid’s view is that "Jurnal 
Ulumul Quran" published this issue twice: in Number 1, vol. IV (1993) and Number 3, 
vol. VI (1995).  
22 Ridwan, “Tempo dan Gerakan Neo-Modernisme,” p. 52. 
23 Panitia Penerbitan Buku dan Seminar 70 Tahun Harun Nasution, Refleksi 
Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam (Jakarta: LSAF, 1989), pp. 267-268. 
24 Ibid., p. 103. 
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created a post-graduate program that produced many highly educated 
Muslims.25  
In connection with the factor of government-Muslims relation, the 
Indonesian government at the beginning of the New Order era 
intended to achieve state security and political stability.26 As a result, 
the government hoped that it could concentrate on development 
activities. With this intention, it minimized the number of existing 
political parties. Suharto’s government persistently believed that the 
conflicting ideologies represented by the political parties were 
responsible for the political chaos in 1965. Therefore, a request by 
Muslims to rehabilitate the Masyumi, the largest modernist Islamic 
political party which was banned by Soekarno in 1960, was not granted 
for fear of a return of old party politicians. Instead, permission was 
granted to form a new Islamic party called Partai Muslimin Indonesia (the 
Parmusi) but only with junior ex-Masyumi leadership. This apparently 
caused Muslim political disappointment with Suharto’s policy towards 
Islam.27  
There was a varied kind of Muslims’ responses towards such a 
New Order’s policy. First, there was a formalist response. This 
response saw that it was necessary to follow formal efforts in 
constructing the ideals of political Islam. For this formalist group, the 
goal of political Islam could only be achieved if the Islamic ummah 
were a legally acknowledged political party. The existence of an Islamic 
party was necessary as a tool for competing in politics, religion and 
inter-ideological groups. Second, there were Muslim groups who gave 
priority to the integrity of Muslim ummah but did not agree with their 
involvement in politics. For this group, the integrity of Muslim ummah 
was more important than practical political needs. Politics is usually 
shadowed by conflicts of interest and therefore would lead to 
                                                 
25 For further information about intellectual development in IAIN see “Intellectual 
Engineering in IAIN,” a supplementary article in Studia Islamika, Vol. 2, Number 1 
(1995), pp. 1-7. 
26 Azyumardi Azra, Esei-esei Intelektual Muslim dan Pendidikan (Jakarta: Logos, 1998), p. 
62. 
27 Muhammad Atho’ Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: A Study of Islamic 
Legal Thought in Indonesia (1975-1988) (Jakarta: INIS, 1993), p. 50. See also Greg Barton, 
“Indonesia’s Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual Ulama: The 
Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernism in Neo-Modernist Thought, Islam 
and Christian-Muslim Relation,” Studia Islamika, Vol. 8, No. 3 (1997), p. 325. 
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disintegration in the Muslim ummah. Third, there was a pragmatic 
response, seeing the earlier two approaches as too idealistic and not 
pragmatic. The supporters of such two approaches are always criticised 
for the leadership of the old political party activists who failed to 
promote the development efforts within Muslim ummah. This third 
group tends to choose an accommodative approach in response to the 
existing social and political development.28   
In addition, as noted by Hefner, there were Muslim intellectuals 
who always took a less pessimistic view of the New Order 
government. They insisted that restrictions on “political Islam” in the 
sense of Islamic political parties which aimed to capture the reins of 
government should not be equated with government opposition to 
“culture” or “civil” Islam, which is to say, a kind of Islam whose 
primary role in the life of the nation is to serve as a source of ethical 
and cultural guidance. In the late 1960s, this optimistic view of 
government-Muslim relations was advocated by a number of young 
Muslim intellectuals, including Usep Fatchuddin and Utomo 
Danandjaja from the Pelajar Islam, Wahib, Rahardjo, and Efendi from 
the “Limited Group” discussion circle in Yogyakarta, and Madjid from 
the Jakarta headquarters of Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI/Islamic 
Students’ Organization).  
As alumni of Islamic student movement in 1965-1966, those 
young Muslim intellectuals as such were neither dependent on nor 
committed to the party organizations of the 1950s. Hence, in the face 
of continuing government restrictions on political parties in the late 
1960s, they distanced themselves from mass politics in favour of a new 
strategy of Islamic revitalization. They were convinced that a long-term 
cultural approach to Islamic revitalization had to be formulated in such 
a way that it is capable of neutralizing military concerns while slowly 
deepening the roots of Islam in the nation as a whole. 29  
In 1975-1979 there were significant changes in the government 
policy. Hefner argues that the government, despite controlling political 
Islam, experienced an important change, as a segment of the ruling 
elite began to recognize the need for a more sympathetic 
                                                 
28 M. Syafi’i Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Politik tentang 
Cendekiawan Muslim Orde Baru (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995), pp. 45-46. 
29 Hefner, “Islam, State and Civil Society,” pp. 4-5. 
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accommodation of Muslim interests. In this matter, Hefner described 
that it can be seen in: 
…the effort by the Departments of Religion and Education 
in expand the institutional foundation for Islamic education  
and dakwah (proselytization) throughout Indonesia. One 
important feature of this effort was the enormous 
expansion in State Islamic Institute Colleges (IAIN) which 
began in the 1960s and which, during the 1970s and 1980s, 
produced large numbers of graduates trained in Islamic 
theology, law, arts, and pedagogy. This expansion in Islamic 
higher education was accompanied by an even more 
impressive program of infra-structural development 
sponsored by the Department of Religion, focusing on the 
construction of mosques, prayer halls (mushalla), and 
Islamic schools (madrasah), especially in areas regarded  as 
only weakly committed  to Islam.30 
The government also realised that the development efforts were 
less useful if Muslims did not engage in their processes. The 
government was aware that many problems facing the nation simply 
could not be solved without the participation of the `ulama>’ or Muslim 
scholars. Based on these reasons, the government supported the 
establishment of the Council of Indonesian ’Ulama>’ (MUI) in 26 July 
1975.31  
The progress of cultural Islam, according to Hefner, was not 
matched in the political arena, however. The early 1980s saw, the 
government escalated its demand that all social and political 
organizations acknowledge the Pancasila as their “sole foundation,” 
under so-called asas tunggal policy. The government’s effort was deeply 
resented by Muslims. The policy had an especially devastating impact 
on Muslims, splintering an already fractured Muslim leadership, as 
disagreement broke out over the proper response to the government 
policy.32  
                                                 
30 Ibid., p. 10. 
31 For further information about MUI, see Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 20 Tahun Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia (Jakarta: MUI, 1995); “Majelis Ulama Indonesia”, in Aqsha, Meij, and 
Meuleman (eds.), Islam in Indonesia, pp. 197–214; Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of 
Indonesian Ulama.  
32 Hefner, “Islam, State and Civil Society,” p. 11. 
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Despite the impact of this policy, according to Hefner, “many 
Muslim leaders regarded the 1980s as a decisive turning point for 
cultural and civil Islam and a vindication of the accommodative 
group’s attitude toward the government. The great majority of Muslim 
intellectuals today believe that their acceptance of the asas tunggal policy 
had an important unintended consequence, which was that Islam was 
no longer associated with any single party.”33  
Gradually there was a shift in perception of the relations between 
the government and Islam in Indonesia, which was the shift from 
strained relations to close relation. This was indicated by Muslim 
support of the government development and modernization programs. 
The government positively responded to Muslims’ support by 
accommodating Islamic interests and involved Muslim ummah in the 
development process. From the above description, to sum up, it is 
clear that the dynamic relations between the government and the 
Muslim community affected the possibility of Muslims to look for 
positions, in which places were taken and in which role they should 
play. Ultimately, this condition was a benefit to the coming generation 
of Muslim intellectuals.  
In addition to the factors of the rise of Muslim intellectuals in the 
1970s and 1980s, the emergence of educated people in Indonesia 
cannot be separated from the improvement of the development 
programs in education. One of the developments in education was the 
increased budget for education and an increased number of 
participants in education (pupils and students). The budget for 
education that was allocated by the government, for example, indicated 
a significant change. In the Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun 
(Repelita/Five-Year Development Plan) II (1974/1975-1978/1979) the 
budget for education was 10.0 percent of the total national budget, and 
in Repelita III (1979/1980-1983/1984) the allocation was increased to 
10.4 percent, and then increased again to 14.7 percent in Repelita IV 
(1984/1985-1988/1989). Based on this sort of data, Indonesia, as 
Anne Both from the Australian National University states, “has 
successfully brought about the revolution in education.”34 This policy 
increased the number of educated people in Indonesia.  
                                                 
33 Ibid., p. 11. 
34 Anne Booth, “Repelita V and Indonesia's Medizm-term Economic Strategy,” Prisma, 
Number 48 (December 1989), pp. 16-17, as quoted in Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam 
Indonesia, pp. 115-116. 
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The revolution of education stimulated increasing number of 
pupils and students, and most of them were santri or Muslims. The 
increasing number of educated people can be seen in the following 
table.35   
Table 1 : Increases in the number of educated people 
in Indonesia from 1971 to 1985 
1971 1980 1985 Level of 
Education N % N % N % 
SD 75,061,921 93.2 93,042,443 89.2 100,627,003 83.5 
SMP 3,528,603 4.5 6,236,461 6.0 10,674,088 8.9 
SMA 1,645,164 2.0 4,537,175 4.3 8,140,790 6.8 
PT 271,388 0.3 508,173 0.5 938,574 0.8 
Total 80,507,076 100.0 104,324,252 100.0 120,380,485 100.0 
Source: Biro Pusat Statistik as quoted by M. Syafii Anwar, Pemikiran dan 
Aksi Islam Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Politik tentang Cendekiawan Muslim 
Orde Baru (Jakarta: Penerbit Paramadina, 1995), p. 116. 
Explanation: 
SD : (Sekolah Dasar/Elementary School) 
SMP : (Sekolah Menengah Pertama/Lower Secondary School)  
SMA : (Sekolah Menengah Atas/Upper Secondary School)  
PT : (Perguruan Tinggi/Tertiary Education) 
The table shows that the number of educated people in Indonesia 
significantly increased in the period of 1971–1985: the number of 
people who had graduated only from elementary school in 1971 
reached 93.2 percent, and then decreased in 1980 to 89.2 percent, and 
further decreased again in 1985 to 83.5 percent. The number of people 
who had graduated only from lower secondary school in 1971 was 4.5 
percent, and then in 1980 increased to 6 percent and to 8.9 percent in 
1985. There were increasing numbers in the upper secondary school as 
well, from 2.0 percent in 1971 to 4.3 percent in 1980, and it increased 
again in 1985 to 6.8 percent. The people who graduated from tertiary 
education also showed an increasing number, from 0.3 percent in 1971 
to 0.5 percent in 1980, and it increased again in 1985 to 0.8 percent. 
                                                 
35 Mitsuo Nakamura, “The Emergence of an Islamizing Middle Class and the 
Dialectics of Political Islam in the New Order of Indonesia: Prelude to the Formation 
of ICMI,” article for conference on "Islam and the Construction of Social Identity," 
University of Honolulu, 4-6 August 1993, p. 11, as quoted by Anwar, Pemikiran dan 
Aksi Islam Indonesia, p. 116. 
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From this sort of data, it can be inferred that the proportion of 
educated people in Indonesia underwent the significant increase in the 
years 1971–1985. 
Together with the increase in the number of educated people in 
Indonesia, the religious education also significantly improved. 
According to the statistical data, the total number of pupils in Madrasah 
Ibtidaiyah (MI/Islamic Elementary School) in 1980, from either state or 
private MIs was 2,941,383 or 14 percent of the total number of SD 
pupils in Indonesia. The number of total SD pupils in Indonesia was 
21,165,742. At the level of lower secondary education, the number of 
Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTs/Islamic lower Secondary Education) was 
340,156, or 11 percent of total SMP pupils. At that time, the total was 
2,894,983.  
In upper secondary education, the number of pupils in Madrasah 
Aliyah (MA/Islamic Upper Secondary School) was 93,840, or 9 percent 
of all SMA pupils which was 1,036,016. In the Pendidikan Guru Agama 
(PGA/Religious Teachers Training School), the number of pupils was 
33.178. Its percentage in comparison to Sekolah Pendidikan Guru 
(SPG/Teacher Training School) was 15 percent of the total number of 
SPG pupils, which was recorded as 213,155. In the tertiary education, 
the number of students at the Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN/State 
Institute for Islamic Studies) was 28,122 or 14.3 percent of the total 
number of Indonesian students studying in state university institutions, 
which were 195,994 students. For further information, see the 
following table: 
Table 2 : A comparison between pupils in general 
school institutions and pupils in Islamic 
school institutions in 1980 
Level of 
Education General Education Islamic Education Percentage 
SD 21,165,724 2,941,383 14 
SMP 2,894,983 340,156 11 
SMA 1,036,016 93,840 9 
SPG 213,155 33,178 15 
PTN 195,994 28,122 14.3 
Sources: Statistik Keagamaan 1980, Buku Saku Statistik Indonesia and 
Dhofier (1983) as quoted by Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia, 
p. 118. 
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Explanation: 
SPG : (Sekolah Pendidikan Guru/Teachers Training School) 
PTN : (Perguruan Tinggi Negeri/State Tertiary Education)    
The data presented in Table 2 show a large number of pupils and 
students at Islamic education institutions from the elementary to the 
tertiary level. This higher percentage has indicated, Zamakhsyari 
Dhofier writes, “a significant role in the intellectualization effort in 
Indonesia.”36  
For further data on the growing numbers of educated people at 
Islamic education institutions in 1980, 1988, 1992, and 2000, the 
following table encapsulates the feature:  
Table 3 : The growing numbers of educated people 
at Islamic education institutions in 1980, 
1988, 1992, and 2000 
Level of 
Education 
1980 1988 1992 2000 
MI 2,941,383 2,998,378 3,252,009 3,221,028 
MTs 340,156 964,466 1,117,159 1,857,277 
MA 93,840 314,041 394,678 441,034 
PTAI 28,122 88,922 152,869 150,898 
Maddin 1,633,638 2,314,071 2,204,645 
Ponpes 913,739 1,657,721 1,626,447 
Total 3,403,501 6,914,184 8,988,507 9,501,321 
Source: tabulated from Data Statistik Direktorat Jendral Pembinaan 
Kelembagaan Agama Islam Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia tahun 
1988, 1992 and 2000 and also from Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam 
Indonesia. 
Explanation: 
PTAI : (Perguruan Tinggi Agama Islam/Islamic Tertiary Education) 
Maddin : (Madrasah Diniyah/Islamic Religious School) 
Ponpes : (Pondok Pesantren/Islamic Boarding School)  
Besides the growing numbers of educated people, the universities 
in Indonesia in the 1970s also played an important role in promoting 
“cultural Islam.” Unlike the situation in the 1950s and 1960s, when 
Indonesia’s national universities became the centre of secular 
                                                 
36 Zamakhsyari Dhofier, “Lembaga Pendidikan Islam dalam Perspektif Nasional,” 
Prisma, Number 9 (September 1983), pp. 13-20, as quoted by Anwar, Pemikiran dan 
Aksi Islam Indonesia, pp. 117 - 118. 
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nationalism, the 1970s saw a rapid growth of Muslim student 
movement in the national universities. The “Salman Movement” at 
Institute Teknologi Bandung (ITB/Bandung Institute of Technology) was 
the first model of this movement.37 These so-called “Salman students”, 
referring to the activists of Salaman mosque in ITB, rejected the 
scholastic argument of traditionalist Islam and the exclusivism of 
modernism. In order to Islamize the secular university, they adopted 
relaxed, democratic forms of dress, amusement, and interaction, while 
encouraging strict adherence to Muslim devotional acts (‘ibādah), 
including the daily prayers, the fast, and the payment of alms (zakāh) to 
the poor.38  
The model of this campus-wide devotional movement was 
developed at the Mosque Salman at ITB under the guidance of M. 
Imaduddin Abdurrahim, a charismatic intellectual who years later 
would play a central role in the establishment of Ikatan Cendekiawan 
Muslim Indonesia (ICMI/the Association of All-Indonesian Muslim 
Intellectuals). Conducting an extensive campaign of religious outreach, 
the Salman Mosque Committee invited pop bands to play at the 
mosque yards, sponsored seminars on religion and development, 
published a small journal of culture and economic affairs, and 
developed a variety of educational and economic programs for poor 
residents living near the universities. 
In Java, Salman-inspired religious activities had become a 
conspicuous feature of campus life at every major university by the 
early 1980s. The movement also led to the formation of discussion 
groups that sought to formulate Muslim political and economic 
policies. A few of these smaller groupings provided the nucleus for the 
more radical Islamic movement that attracted public attention and 
support in the 1980s and 1990s.39 
Another important factor that influenced the dynamic of religious 
life (cultural Islam) and influenced the emergence of religious study 
clubs among Muslim students was the restriction of student 
                                                 
37 For a detailed study of the Salman movement, see Azyumardi Azra, Esei-esei 
Intelektual Muslim dan Pendidikan (Jakarta: Logos, 1998) pp. 61-70; Abdul Aziz, Imam 
Tholkhah, Soetarman (eds.), Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Indonesia (Jakarta: Pustaka 
Firdaus, 1994).  
38 Hefner, “Islam, State and Civil Society,” p. 13. 
39 Ibid. 
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organizations and activities in campus. When Daud Yusuf became the 
Minister of Education and Culture in 1978, the government restricted 
student political activities by issuing the so-called Normalisasi Kehidupan 
Kampus dan Badan Koordinasi Kampus, Badan Koordinasi Kegiatan 
Kemahasiswaan (NKK/BKK, Normalization of Campus Live, Campus 
Coordination Body, Coordination Body for Students Activity). This 
policy was intended to force the student back to the scholarly and 
intellectual activities and keep them away from political practise 
activities. As a result, the student organizations on Campus, such as the 
Student Senate and the Student Representative Council, did not work 
properly.  
This condition also gave rise to the weakening of the institutional 
capacity of the existing extra campus student organizations, including 
HMI and PMII (or Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia/Indonesian 
Muslim Student Movement). One positive consequence of this 
condition was the emergence of a new direction in student activity, 
namely from political to intellectual activity. Study groups 
concentrating on Islamic discussion and Islamic propagation activity in 
the form of the so-called “usrah movement” became a new 
alternative.40 
The intellectual and religious dynamics were at the forefront 
during the 1980s. This was indicated by an increased publication of 
religious books, seminars, and speeches on religious themes. Various 
religious activities were carried out on campuses. The mosque as a 
place for Muslim to perform religious worship became overloaded. 
Islamic learning (pengajian) was intensively established in state or private 
offices, and many hotels conducted fashion shows of Islamic dress.  
The intellectual dynamic through the increased publication of 
Islamic books, as indicated above, can be clearly seen in Tempo's survey. 
The survey was done by the division of Library and documentation of 
this weekly news magazine, which concluded that the printed materials 
in the 1980s indicated the more rising religious study. From the 7,241 
books collected by Tempo since 1980, 1,949 books of them discuss 
religious themes. 70.5% or 809 of the above amount are Islamic books, 
which are written by Indonesian writers or are translated from foreign 
                                                 
40 As concluded from the interviews with Azyumardi Azra, Jakarta, 27 August 2000; 
and Bahtiar Effendy, Jakarta, 28 August 2000. 
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Muslim or non-Muslim writers.41 What is interesting to note here is 
that the Tempo editors reported that the increased publication of 
Islamic books could stimulate intellectual discourse in Indonesia. The 
publication was initiated by the younger generation, and its results were 
quantitatively and qualitatively something to be proud of.42   
The intellectual activities in the 1980s were also coloured by the 
increase in seminars and intellectual dialogues between Muslims and 
other religious adherents. Dialogues were promoted by Muslim and 
non-Muslim scientists in many centres of education and in many cities 
in Indonesia. An intensive dialogue, in either formal or informal forms, 
was also carried out between Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and 
Muhammadiyah, especially among their older and younger generation. 
The dialogue had a significant impact on their intellectual 
development. In this case, Wahid had an important role, for example, 
in motivating the emergence of young Muslim intellectuals affiliated 
with NU.43  
As a continuing phase, the development of Muslim intellectuals in 
the 1990s cannot be separated from the features of Muslim 
intellectuals in the previous decades. This development was particularly 
in connection to the relation between Islam and the New Order 
government during the period of 1966-1990. From the beginning of 
the New Order government (1966) to the 1970s, the interaction 
between Islam and the government was characterised by the so-called 
“hegemonic relation”.44 This period witnessed the ideological and 
political domination of the government. The government outlined that 
modernization was the only and best alternative to solve the problem 
of national decline.  
Some old leading Muslim intellectuals appeared to be opposed to 
the concept of modernization. This reactive response caused a tension 
between Islamic community and the New Order government. 
                                                 
41 Nico J. Tampi, Trend Bacaan 1980an: Cermin Meningkatnya Telaah Keagamaan (Jakarta: 
Majalah Tempo, 1987), as quated by Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia,  pp. 
124-125. 
42 Editor, 14 Mai 1988, as quated by Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia, p. 125. 
43 He was described as “cultural breaker” between traditionalist Muslim, modernist, 
secular and non-Muslims.  See Ihsan Ali Fauzi, “Pemikiran Islam Indonesia decade 
1980an,” Prisma (3 March 1991), p. 39.  
44 This term is borrowed from Anwar. See Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia, 
especially p. ix. 
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Witnessing this negative effect, many of the younger generation of 
Muslim intellectuals tried to respond to it in other ways. They 
demonstrated a pro-active response to the modernisation program of 
the New Order government.45 Those younger Muslim Intellectuals 
chose a cultural approach in presenting their interest rather than a 
political one.  
The 1980s evidenced another form of relation, which M. Syafii 
Anwar called it a “reciprocal relation”.46 This form of interaction was 
reflected by a growing mutual understanding between Islamic 
community and New Order government. This reciprocal relation was 
the result of cultural strategy expressed and supported by some Muslim 
intellectuals. They showed their pro-active response to the 
government’s development program and did not directly involve 
themselves in political parties. They preferred to join the government 
system. This better relation was said by “the great majority of Muslim 
intellectuals” ―borrowing Hefner’s phrase―47 to be an unintended 
consequence of the Islamic organization’s acceptance of the 
government policy to promote “Pancasila” as a sole foundation (asas 
tunggal) for all political and social organizations. 
The significant change was seen in the 1990s, when Islam and the 
government respectively accommodated the interest of each other. 
Soeharto as the president became a central figure, and his centralistic 
policy can be taken therefore as an indicator of the relation between 
Islam and government in Indonesia. What can be seen in the 1990s is 
that Soeharto was more prepared to accommodate Muslim interests. 
According to Ramage, this is due to both the Islamic acceptance of 
asas tunggal and the fact that Soeharto needed Islamic support to 
compensate for decreased backing from the armed forces. Another 
reason could be personal. Soeharto may genuinely have felt closer to 
                                                 
45 See for further discussion Muhammad Kamal Hasan, Muslim Intellectual Response to 
“New Order” Modernisation in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 
Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1980). This work has been translated into Indonesian. 
See Muhammad Kamal Hasan, Modernisasi Indonesia: Respon Cendekiawan Muslim, transl. 
by Ahmadie Thaha (Jakarta: Lingkaran Studi Indonesia, 1987). 
46 Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia, p. x. 
47 Hefner, “Islam, State and Civil Society,” p. 11.  
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religion. Many Indonesians allow that it is natural as person ages for 
him or her to become more religiously devout.48   
Evidence of the mutual accommodation between the government 
and Muslim ummah, as described by Hefner, are two pieces of 
legislation initiated by Soeharto:  
First, Law no. 7 passed by the DPR in 1989 concerned 
“religious court law”. Ramage argued that it was not so 
much new law, but a clarification and reaffirmation of the 
independence and equality of religious (Islamic) courts of 
law (that deal with family, divorce, and inheritance matters) 
with civil courts.49 Second, Law no. 2, 1989 on the national 
education system affirmed the continuance of religious 
education in public schools and recognized religious 
education as a formal subsystem to the national education 
system. It stipulated that religious instruction was to be 
compulsory in all public schools and universities.50 
More evidence can be seen through three other important cases. 
They include the government’s support of the establishment of ICMI 
in 1990, the Joint Decree between the Minister of Internal Affairs and 
the Minister of Religious Affairs in 1991 that regulates the effectivity 
of collecting zaka>h,51 and the Decree of the Directorate General of 
Elementary and Secondary Education of the Minister of Education 
and Culture that regulates and permittes the use of jilbab52 for female 
students.53  
The accommodation of Muslim interests by the government was 
the result of Muslim intellectuals’ clarification in a rational way of the 
                                                 
48 Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance 
(London: Routledge, 1995), p. 78. 
49 Ibid., p. 86. 
50 The religious education law was technically neutral with regard to faith –it would 
allow religious instruction in all faith in government schools. See, ibid., p. 86. 
51 The yearly religious tax required of all Muslims as part of their religious obligations. 
The tax is voluntarily in Indonesia and is usually given to the poor through a 
committee.  
52 Head covering worn by some Muslim women to cover all the head except the oval 
of the face. It has become popular in Indonesia over the past twenty years, especially 
among purist groups, who regard it as a sign of piety.  
53 Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia, p. 12. See also Studia Islamika, Vol. 2, No. 
1 (1995), p. 209.   
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national ideology of Pancasila, and that of the integration between 
Islam and Indonesia’s state. Those Muslims intellectuals explained that 
the goal of the state was not contradicted with Islam, and that 
Pancasila is compatible with Islam. The explanation influenced the 
attitude and the policy of the government toward Islam. According to 
Mordiono, the cabinet’s secretary of the Soeharto government, the 
thought of Muslim intellectuals on Islam-state ideology issues “has 
contributed, in the conceptual manner, to the necessity of 
strengthening the relation between government and Islamic ummah”.54 
The Educational Background of Muslim Intellectuals 
The educational background of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals in 
the last three decades of the twentieth century can be mainly classified 
into two sorts. First is a sort of educational background confirming 
that some Muslim scholars received their education in public 
educational institutions, such as SMP, SMA, and University. Second is 
a sort of educational background which suggests that some other 
Muslim intellectuals received their education in Islamic educational 
institutions, such as MTs, MA, and Islamic Tertiary Education.  
Muslim intellectuals who had completed their education in public 
educational institutions usually have a santri family background. From 
the beginning they received religious influence and religious experience 
from their family. In addition, they attended a religious teaching in the 
Madrasah Diniyah, a formal education that implements a grade system, 
has a certain curriculum for a certain class, and adopts evaluation 
system like other schools at the end of the academic term. Most of the 
curricula are religious sciences. The class is usually held at the 
afternoon.  
Even, some of those Muslim intellectuals who had completed their 
education in public educational institutions associated with a certain 
pesantren (Islamic boarding school). They may come from an elite 
family or, in Javanese case, from priyayi (nominal Muslim) family who 
express religiously less devout practices than santri (committed 
Muslims). They were actively involved, however, in Islamic student 
associations during their study at tertiary education, such as HMI. For 
its activism during the 1960s and 1970s, HMI became the leading 
university Islamic student movement. It was a supporter of the 
                                                 
54 Mordiono, “Umat Beragama dan Negara Nasional,” article for Symposiom “Festival 
Istiqlal 1991”, as quoted by Anwar, Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia, p. 238. 
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Soeharto government in its crucial first years, and for this reason it 
rallied other larger Muslims to support the government.  
Some others of Muslim intellectuals associated with PMII, an extra 
campus student organisation founded in the 1960s with a certain level 
of affiliation with the NU. Although it was declared in 1972 as an 
independent student organization, PMII’s cultural presentation has 
been closely related to the NU as clearly suggested at the first time of 
its inception. This student organization has strong, loyal supporters 
especially at IAIN campuses.  
Such a wide range of Muslim intellectuals with different organisa-
tional affiliations communicated to each other, both personally and 
organisationally. This way of interaction resulted in the growing 
intention among them to become devout Muslims by learning more 
about Islam. The success of attaining extensive knowledge in their 
fields in public educational institutions, combined with the religious 
understanding gained from their involvement in Islamic student 
organizations and interaction with other devout Muslims, coloured 
their existence as Muslim Intellectuals. After graduating, they directly 
involved themselves in the social activities and in the production of 
knowledge.  
Another form of education that Muslim intellectuals have 
undertaken is the one provided by Islamic educational institutions. 
Most of these Muslim intellectuals come from santri families, therefore 
their parents wanted to maintain the santri attitude of their family. 
Besides attending the school or Islamic higher learning institutions, 
they were also involved actively in student organizations, intra and 
extra campus. These activities made it possible for them to 
communicate with other students affiliated with the so-called public 
educational institutions.  
Through such a kind of interaction, they could have an advantage 
of being engaged in the transfer of knowledge, of getting common 
knowledge and of becoming more interested in learning not only 
religious sciences but also non-religious topics. They deepened their 
non-religious knowledge through self-learning. The student organiza-
tions usually hold discussions and seminars on current themes, both 
religious and nonreligious, which are oriented to the public interest.  
As an Islamic higher learning institution in Indonesia, IAIN 
specifically has had a significant contribution to the emerging of 
Indonesian Muslim intellectuals. Historically, the embryo of IAIN was 
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initially developed from Akademi Dinas Ilmu Agama (ADIA/Govern-
ment Academy for religious Studies) and Perguruan Tinggi Agama Islam 
Negeri (PTAIN/the State Islamic Higher Education). ADIA was 
founded in Jakarta in 1957 and was intended as a training college for 
officials of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in government service and 
for religious teachers in state schools. PTAIN originated from the 
faculty of Theology at Indonesian Islamic University (UII) in 
Yogyakarta. On 12 August 1950, this faculty was separated from UII 
and taken over by the government. On 26 September 1951, it was 
officially re-opened under the name of PTAIN. In 1960 the PTAIN 
and ADIA were united to form the IAIN under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs.  
The establishment of Islamic higher educational institutions, 
including PTAIN and ADIA, was both for political and academic 
reasons. In terms of politics, the founding of these Islamic higher 
educational institutions was an outcome of the response of Muslim 
groups to the government dominated by secular groups. Academically, 
the establishment of these institutions were intended to provide an 
alternative to a secular higher education. The Muslims felt that they 
were abandoned by the government which only supported the creation 
of general universities without any faculty of Islamic Studies. This 
encouraged some Muslims to build private Islamic higher educational 
institutions in order to provide Muslim community with educational 
services and to disseminate the teachings of Islam. 
 Al-Azhar University in Cairo had indeed been an inspirational 
model for the architects of IAIN across Indonesia. The IAIN Jakarta 
and IAIN Yogyakarta, as the two oldest among others and now 
transforming themselves into the Universitas Islam Negeri or UIN (the 
State Islamic University), have developed into institutions that in many 
ways are much broader than al-Azhar. It was not until the 1970s that a 
serious, but gradual, process of reform saw the transformation of the 
IAIN into institutions that combined traditional Islamic scholarship 
with a modern approach in learning. But even in the late 1960s 
significant individual members of staff, such as Nasution at the IAIN 
Jakarta and Ali at the IAIN Yogyakarta, were exerting a progressive 
influence on certain students, pushing them to think through the basis 
of their convictions and to approach the study of Islam in a critically 
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informed fashion. Under their leadership, IAIN created a post-
graduate program that produced many highly educated Muslims. 55 
Compared with other graduates, the alumni of IAIN or other 
Islamic education institutions have at least two important specifi-
cations. First, they have knowledge of religious science that gives them 
self-confidence. Second, because they also informally study a “non-
religious science” or “general science”, they are also knowledgeable in 
general sciences. In discussing the problem of modernization, for 
example, they use modern idioms. The alumni of public educational 
institutions, on the other hand, do not have such self-confidence when 
discussing the problem of religion. In discussing social, political and 
economic problems in Indonesia, for example, one cannot ignore their 
relation with Islam. Thus, the alumni from IAIN are more vocal and 
easier to understand when they discuss and analyse the social, religious, 
and political problems than the alumni from other institutions.56 
Currently, Madjid, Azyumardi Azra, and Komaruddin Hidayat are 
among those who represent the alumni of IAIN and other religious 
education institutions; who have become authoritative Muslim 
intellectuals and dominate Islamic discourses in Indonesia.57  
The government has an important role in maintaining cooperation 
between educational institutions. For the purpose of furthering better 
quality of education in IAIN, for example, the Directorate of Higher 
Islamic Education Institutions of the Ministry of Religious Affairs has 
taken some important measures in order to anticipate further 
challenges. One measure is sending IAIN lecturers to Western and 
                                                 
55 For further discussion about IAIN, see “Empowering Islamic Higher Education 
Institutions,” Studia Islamika, an additional information, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1997), p. 3; B.J. 
Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 
pp. 120-123; Mastuki HS., “Tat }awwur al-Ta`li >m al-’A <li> bi Indonesia,” Studia Islamika, 
Vol. 4, No. 3 (1997), p. 172; Barton, “Indonesia’s Nurcholish Madjid and 
Abdurrahman Wahid,” p. 328.  
56 Interview with Komaruddin Hidayat, Jakarta, 25 August 2000.  
57 In the 1980s, there was criticism of the IAIN graduates. IAIN graduates were 
perceived as being unable to fulfil their role when rural people are being urbanized, the 
agrarian economic system is being replaced by an industrial one, and traditional 
leadership is being marginalized by modern one.  The task of explaining Islam from a 
modern point of view has been undertaken by Indonesian Muslim social scientists, 
who begun to return from their studies at Western universities. They occupied Islamic 
discourses on university campuses and in the community in general.  See “Intellectual 
Engineering in IAIN,” p. 3. See also Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, pp. 77-78. 
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Middle Eastern countries to undertake post-graduate programs in 
various fields of study. They are financially supported by the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs or the host government through a joint scheme in 
educational programs. Some lecturers have also been sent to other 
Indonesian universities, while the rest are obliged to undertake post-
graduate programs at IAINs themselves.58 
Bahtiar Effendy from the UIN Jakarta said that the extra campus 
organization has made a significant contribution to the formation of 
students’ concern of the intellectual activity.  At the end of the 1970s, 
for example, student activists, including Effendy, Komaruddin 
Hidayat, Azyumardi Azra, Fachry Ali, Hadimulyo, and A. Rifa’i, 
conducted discussions every Wednesday at the Lembaga Penelitian, 
Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES/Institute for the 
Research, Education, and Information on Economy and Society)59 
Jakarta under the guidance of Rahardjo, the director of this institute at 
that time. This kind of activity could enlarge the intellectual 
perspective of IAIN students especially in the field of social sciences 
and made it possible for them to be directly engaged in social research, 
social work, and social advocacy.60  
The study clubs which emerged in the middle of the 1980s in 
Jakarta also contributed to the formation of students’ intellectual 
engagement. Many students joined study clubs such as Formaci, 
Piramida Circle, and Forum Studi Lingkaran. The reason they preferred to 
join study clubs rather than student organizations was due to their 
disappointment with the extra campus student organization activities 
which especially in 1985 did not emphasize intellectually oriented 
activities.61 The organizations concentrated merely on recruiting as 
many new cadres as possible. According to Azra, the reason for the 
emergence of study clubs in the middle of the 1980s was the 
assumption that the existing extra campus student organizations, such 
                                                 
58 For further information see “Intellectual Engineering in IAIN,” pp. 1-6.  
59 LP3ES was established in 1971 as a further development of a project that was 
sponsored by Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (FNS), Germany. The project was begun in 
1969. See, Martin van Bruinessen, NU, Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa dan Pencarian Wacana 
Baru (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1994), p. 236. 
60 Interview with Bahtiar Effendy, Jakarta, 28 August 2000; Interview with Azyumardi 
Azra, Jakarta, 27 August 2000; Interview with Komaruddin Hidayat, Jakarta, 25 August 
2000. 
61 Interview with Bahtiar Effendy, Jakarta, 28 August 2000. 
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as HMI, PMII or IMM (Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah/the Asso-
ciation of Muhammadiyah Student) were too late in responding to the 
idea of Islamic movement after the Iranian revolution. There was a 
euphoric enthusiasm over the success of Iran in opposing the United 
States. For this reason many students established study clubs which 
were oriented to discuss intellectually the idea of Islam and society.62 
They were not interested with non-intellectually oriented activity of 
student organizations.63  
The same form of student’s affiliation with organization and study 
clubs also emerged in Yogyakarta. The principle difference is the time 
when the students joined the study clubs. They began to join or to 
establish study club after they could no longer be affiliated with 
student organizations. In order to accommodate their potentiality of 
activism and intellectualism, they established an institution or joined an 
existing institution immediately after they graduated. LKiS (Lembaga 
Kajian Islam dan Sosial/the Institute for Islamic and Social Studies) in 
Yogyakarta was established in 1989 in this way. At first, this institution 
was an informal study group consisting of students from IAIN, UII, 
and UGM (State Gajah Mada University). Because of the need of 
management and the dissemination of information and knowledge and 
specifically because of the need to build LKiS as a formal institution, it 
was then declared as a non-profit foundation.64 This foundation has 
promoted a number of intellectual activities.  
In Surabaya, the student activists, especially activists of PMII, also 
tried to associate in a study forum called Gerbang (founded in 1993). 
This forum consisted of Airlangga University and IAIN Sunan Ampel 
students. Their first contact began from their activity in the student 
press. When they finished studying, they continued their intellectual 
activity by promoting a new institution called èLSAD (Lembaga Studi 
Agama dan Demokrasi/the Institute for the Study of Religion and 
Democracy). It was oriented toward studying the relation of religion 
and democracy by conducting research and through discussions and 
publications. They published Gèrbang, a journal on religion and 
democracy. This journal was acknowledged by Muhammad AS Hikam 
                                                 
62 Interview with Azyumardi Azra, Jakarta, 27 August 2000. 
63 Interview with Bahtiar Effendy  Jakarta, 28 August 2000. 
64 Unpublished pamphlet of LKiS.  
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as a “high intensity” periodical publication.65 Hikam also rendered the 
activist of èLSAD, as well as other young intellectuals within NU, as 
people with a “hybrid culture”, a culture being based not only on the 
traditional sources of Islam but also on the other.66   
Conclusion 
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that three 
important factors influenced the emergence of Indonesian Muslim 
Intellectuals in the 1970s and 1980s. First was the publicly rising 
Islamic thought renewal movement promoted by scholars, including 
Madjid, Nasution, and Ali. Second was the increasingly intense socio-
political relation between the government and the Muslim community 
during the New Order period. Third was the success story of 
education as well as the socio-political and academic activities of the 
Muslim student movement. Nevertheless, the most dominant factor 
among those three was the third one. The vertical mobility of Muslims 
in social and political institution, as shown in the 1990s, was a result of 
their success in education.  
Four sorts of Muslim intellectuals with their own organisational 
affiliation appeared clearly in the last three decades of the twentieth 
century during their study at universities. First was a sort of Muslim 
intellectuals whose academic grades were good and were actively 
engaged in the student organisation in campus. Second was a kind of 
Muslim intellectuals who were actively engaged in extra campus 
student organisations, such as HMI and PMII. Third was a type of 
Muslim intellectuals whose academic activity during their study at 
university centred around the discussion clubs. They formed a 
discussion forum that consisted of student from various universities 
along with their different subject of studies. Fourth was a sort of 
Muslim intellectuals who were actively engaged in all intra or extra 
campus student organisations in addition to many discussion clubs. [] 
 
                                                 
65 Interview with Muhammad AS Hikam, Jakarta, 16 July 2000.  
66 Muhammad AS Hikam, “Anak Muda NU, Kultur Hibrid dan Negara,” in Kultur 
Hibrida: Anak Muda NU di Jalur Kultural, ed. by Hairus Salim HS and Muhammad 
Ridwan (Yogyakarta: LKiS,  1999), pp. 259-260.  
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